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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

SMIGIEL v. FRANCHOT: THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS
THE POWER TO ENACT LEGISLATION THAT IS
CONTINGENT UPON PASSAGE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT THROUGH POPULAR VOTE THAT WOULD
ALLOW SLOT MACHINES IN MARYLAND.
By: Matthew Powell

T

he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the General Assembly
validly enacted legislation that was contingent upon voter
approval of a proposed constitutional amendment to allow slot
machines in Maryland. Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 Md. 302, 978 A.2d
687 (2009). Furthermore, the court held that a judicial challenge to
one house's adjournment for more than three days, without the consent
of the other house, was a nonjusticiable political question. fd. at 32526, 978 A.2d at 701.
On October 29, 2007, Governor Martin O'Malley proposed
legislation designed to generate funds to increase budget savings and
combat a potential $1.7 billion deficit by implementing slot machines
in Maryland. The General Assembly conducted a special session for
the sole purpose of passing or rejecting the Governor's proposed
legislation. On November 12, 2007, which was a Monday and
Veterans' Day, it was evident that the House of Delegates would not
have a bill prepared for the Senate's consideration for several days. In
light of this, on the same day, the President of the Senate contacted the
Speaker ofthe House of Delegates and requested the House's approval
of the Senate's extended adjournment. The Speaker consented, and
the Speaker's staff issued and responded to a memorandum of consent.
However, neither message was read to the House of Delegates, nor did
the House of Delegates vote on whether to approve the Senate's
extended adjournment. Still, the Senate extended its adjournment,
which had already consisted of the three-day Veterans' Day weekend,
until Thursday, while it awaited receipt of the House's version of the
bill.
On November 15, 2007, the Senate reconvened and remained in
session along with the House until November 19, 2007, when the
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houses reconciled differences between their versions of the bills and
passed legislation entitled "Maryland Education Trust Fund-Video
Lottery Terminals," which Governor O'Malley signed into law on the
same day. The enactment of the bill was contingent upon the passage
of a constitutional amendment through a majority vote in a general
election.
However, prior to the Senate reconvening on November 15, 2007,
Michael Smigiel ("Smigiel"), a member of the House of Delegates,
inquired as to whether the Senate's adjournment extension violated
Article III, section 25 of the Maryland Constitution, which requires
approval from the other chamber for adjournments of more than three
days. The House Parliamentarian rejected Smigiel's challenge and
concluded that the General Assembly was "constitutionally proceeding
appropriately. "
On December 13,2007, Smigiel filed a Verified Complaint seeking
Emergency Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in the Circuit Court for
Carroll County challenging the legislation. On January 10, 2008, the
circuit court granted the State's Motion to Dismiss, holding that the
legislation was valid. Smigiel appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland while simultaneously petitioning the Court of
Appeals of Maryland for writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted the writ before the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland could hear oral arguments.
The court considered two issues. Smigiel, 410 Md. at 310, 978
A.2d at 692. First, the court addressed whether the General Assembly
may pass a bill that is contingent upon voter approval of a proposed
constitutional amendment. Id. Second, the court considered whether
bills passed during an extraordinary session, in which the Senate
extended its adjournment without obtaining approval of the House of
Delegates, are valid. Id.
As to the contingency issue, Smigiel contended that the legislation
was an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking power. Id. Smigiel
relied on Brawner v. Supervisors of Elections, wherein the court struck
down legislation that hinged its effectiveness and validity upon voter
approval. Id. at 311-12,978 A.2d at 693-94 (citing Brawner, 141 Md.
586,602, 119 A. 250, 254 (1922)).
The court distinguished the instant case from Brawner. Id. at 31213, 978 A.2d at 694. In Brawner, the court rejected the General
Assembly'S effort to place an already enacted and signed statute
before the voters for approval or disapproval. Smigiel, 410 Md. at
312-13, 978 A.2d at 694. In the present situation, however, the
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legislature asked voters to approve a proposed constitutional
amendment in accordance with Article XIV, section 1 of the Maryland
Constitution. ld. at 313, 978 A.2d at 694. Voter approval of the
constitutional amendment would then trigger appropriations in the
already enacted bills. Id. As a result, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland declared that, unlike the voters in Brawner, voters in this
case were not approving or rejecting a statute, but rather, were
approving or rejecting a constitutional amendment upon which a
statute was merely contingent. Id. The court held that, not only does
the General Assembly have the power to enact legislation contingent
upon popular approval of a constitutional amendment by the state's
voters, but that this practice has occurred on multiple occasions in
Maryland. Id. at 316-17, 978 A.2d at 696-97 (citing 1990 Md. Laws,
Chapters 62 & 515 (clerks of court-employees and funding), 1980
Md. Laws, Chapters 523, 525, & 526 (supreme bench consolidation),
and 1972 Md. Laws, Chapters 364 & 365 (state lottery)). This
practice has also been approved by other state courts and the Supreme
Court of the United States. Id. at 317-18, 978 A.2d at 696-97 (citing
Druggan v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 36 (1925); Fullam v. Brock, 271 N.C.
145, 155 S.E.2d 737 (1967); Henson v. Georgia Indus. Realty Co., 220
Ga. 857, 142 S.E.2d 219 (1965)).
Regarding the adjournment issue, Article III, section 25 of the
Maryland Constitution states that neither house in the General
Assembly shall adjourn for more than three days without the consent
of the other house. Smigiel, 410 Md. at 321, 978 A.2d at 699 (citing
MD. CONST. art. III, § 25). Smigiel argued that the President of the
Senate violated article III, section 25 by extending the Senate's
adjournment beyond three days without obtaining approval from the
House of Delegates. Id. Specifically, Smigiel asserted that the
Maryland Constitution required the Senate to obtain the consent of the
House of Delegates sitting as a legislative body. Id. As a result of the
Senate's failure to comply with the constitutional requirements,
Smigiel argued that the court's only recourse would be to invalidate all
legislation passed during the extraordinary session. Id. at 321-22, 978
A.2d 699.
While the court recognized that article III, section 25 ensures that
both houses of the General Assembly fulfill their legislative duties, the
court disagreed with Smigiel's assertion that the Senate's failure to
comply should invalidate all legislation passed during the legislative
session. Id. at 322, 978 A.2d at 699. As a threshold issue, the court
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considered whether judicial review of the Senate's adjournment could
occur. Id. at 323, 978 A.2d 700.
In Lamb v. Hammond, a case involving a court-ordered count of
absentee ballots in a House of Delegates election, the ~ourt adopted a
two-part test to detennine whether an issue is a nonjusticiable political
question that is not subject to judicial review. Smigiel, 410 Md. at
323-24, 978 A.2d 700-01 (citing Lamb, 308 Md. 286, 293, 518 A.2d
1057, 1060 (1987)). First, a court must evaluate whether the claim
presented and the relief sought are capable of judicial resolution. Id. at
324, 978 A.2d 701 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 51617 (1969)).
Second, a court has to detennine whether the
governmental structure renders the presented issue a political question
barred from judicial consideration under the Constitution. Id. at 325,
978 A.2d at 701 (citing Powell, 395 U.S. at 517).
The court concluded that the proposed issue contravened the
second prong of the Lamb test as a nonjusticiable political question
because addressing the issue would fail to respect a coordinate branch
of government, the legislature. Id. at 325-26, 978 A.2d at 701.
Therefore, the court declared that the issue of consensual adjournment
is best resolved by the General Assembly. Id. at 325-26, 978 A.2d at
701.
In Smigiel v. Franchot, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
guaranteed the General Assembly's ability to pass legislation that is
contingent upon popular approval of a constitutional amendment,
which allows the General Assembly to pass bills that anticipate or
adapt legislation to pending constitutional amendments. In doing so,
the court struck down what many recognized as an ad hoc and
frivolous challenge to validly passed legislation. Additionally, the
decision requires the General Assembly to enforce its own policies and
procedures internally. While the court's decision primarily impacts
legislators, practitioners and judges should also note the reaffinnation
of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.

